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Introduction
This article addresses the question of how the right to 
fork open source projects – to use the source code of an 
existing program to start a new, independent version – 
works as a governance mechanism to provide sustain-
ability in open source software. The concept of sustain-
ability is under debate, with numerous rubrics against 
which the sustainability of a product may be measured 
(e.g.,  Connelly,  2007:  tinyurl.com/atjcgq3;  Davison,  2001: 
tinyurl.com/aukl5ch;  McManus,  1996:  tinyurl.com/a5usfo3). 
Within the context of the current study, sustainability is 
defined as the possibility of an open source program to 
continue to serve the needs of its developers and users.
While code forking may lead to redundant independent 
efforts, it represents the single greatest tool available for 
guaranteeing sustainability in open source software. In 
this  article,  we  examine  code  forking  within  open 
source  initiatives  and  discuss  the  managerial  implica-
tions  of  code  forking.  The  article  is  structured  as  fol-
lows: first, we offer some background on code forking; 
second, we look at how code forking affects governance 
on  the  three  levels  mentioned;  finally,  we  explain  the 
relevance of these findings and their management im-
plications.
Background
Code forking has often been viewed in a negative light. 
At the core of this negative view is the continued use of 
a  restrictive,  and  perhaps  outdated,  definition  of  the 
term forking. Until recently, the term fork was mainly 
used to describe a situation in which a developer com-
munity had split into competing camps, each continu-
ing  work  on  their  own,  incompatible  version  of  the 
software  (see,  for  example,  Raymond,  1999: 
tinyurl.com/3ald3;  Fogel,  2006:  tinyurl.com/3dx2py).  Hence, 
the  negative  tone  found  in  discussions  of  forking  has 
been  related  to  concerns  regarding  the  hindered  pro-
gress, wasted resources, and potential demise of one or 
both of the projects. In recent years, the term forking 
The right to fork open source code is at the core of open source licensing. All open source 
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guaranteeing sustainability in open source software. In addition to bolstering program sus-
tainability, code forking directly affects the governance of open source initiatives. Forking, 
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grants the community to safeguard against unfavourable actions by corporations or pro-
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forking helps keep open source initiatives relevant and presents opportunities for the de-
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The ability to fork code – a central freedom of open 
source software – is what keeps communities vibrant 
and companies honest.
Glyn Moody
Technology writer and journalist
“ ”Technology Innovation Management Review January 2013
8 www.timreview.ca
Code Forking, Governance, and Sustainability in Open Source Software
Linus Nyman and Juho Lindman
has come to be used in a much broader context, encom-
passing  all  cases  in  which  one  takes  an  existing  code 
base and implements it in a separate project (see, for in-
stance, GitHub: tinyurl.com/7uc94sk). In the context of this 
study, we adhere to this broader definition of forking.
While there are many reasons why projects are forked, 
the most common reason is the desire to modify the ori-
ginal program to better address a specific need (Nyman 
and Mikkonen, 2011; tinyurl.com/arntyur). Forks may also 
be  planned,  temporary  divergences  intended  to  test 
new ideas and features, with the intention of later integ-
rating  effective  improvements  back  into  the  original 
(Nyman and Mikkonen, 2011: tinyurl.com/arntyur; see also 
GitHub:  tinyurl.com/7uc94sk).  The  right  to  fork  code  is 
built into the very definition of what it means to be an 
open  source  program.  The  third  criteria  of  the  Open 
Source Initiative’s (OSI; opensource.org/osd.html) definition 
of open source states that the license “must allow modi-
fications  and  derived  works.”  Similarly,  the  Free  Soft-
ware  Foundation’s  Free  Software  Definition  (FSD; 
gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html)  states  that  users  have  the 
freedom to “run, copy, distribute, study, change and im-
prove the software.” All spinoff initiatives can be con-
sidered forks as they are “modified or derived” (OSI) or 
“copied,  changed  and  improved”.  The  possibility  of 
forking any project affects the governance and sustain-
ability of all open source programs.
Software  is  editable,  interactive,  reprogrammable,  dis-
tributed,  and  open  (Kallinikos  et  al.,  2010; 
tinyurl.com/4zn6cun).  These  characteristics  dictate  that 
software is prone to being changed, repaired, and up-
dated rather than remaining fixed from the early stages 
of the design process. The openness combined with the 
granular composition of the software offer new ways of 
governance  (Benkler,  2006;  tinyurl.com/6ftot3).  This  gov-
ernance is not tied to over-appropriating a natural re-
source  (Ostrom,  1991;  tinyurl.com/b8rc2pu),  but  rather 
related to ways in which a group of developers, follow-
ing  institutional  rules,  collectively  produce  a  public 
good (Schweik et al., 2010; tinyurl.com/aqxy2jp).
Three Levels of Governance
1. Software level
The nature of the industry dictates that programs can-
not maintain a stable steady state for an extended peri-
od  of  time.  They  must  continue  to  evolve  in  order  to 
remain useful and relevant. Without continual adapta-
tion, a program will progressively become less satisfact-
ory  (Lehman,  1980;  tinyurl.com/b2mpkw3).  Conversely, 
truly successful software is able to adapt and even out-
live  the  hardware  for  which  it  was  originally  written 
(Brooks, 1975;  tinyurl.com/awg3rrw). Therefore, the ability 
to  change  and  evolve  is  a  key  component  of  software 
sustainability. Although stagnation may be a precursor 
to  obsolescence,  obsolescence  need  not  creep  into  a 
project over time; it is often a design feature.
Popularized in the 1950s by American industrial design-
er  Brooks  Stevens  (The  Economist,  2009;  tinyurl.com/
ahws66g), the concept of planned obsolescence stands in 
stark contrast to the concept of sustainability. Stevens 
defined planned obsolescence as the act of instilling in 
the buyer “the desire to own something a little newer, a 
little  better,  a  little  sooner  than  is  necessary”  (Brooks 
Stevens’  biography;  tinyurl.com/bbs8a3c).  Considered  “an 
engine of technological progress” by some (Fishman et 
al., 1993; tinyurl.com/bye2n5r), yet increasingly problemat-
ized  in  the  business  ethics  literature  (Guiltinan,  2009; 
tinyurl.com/alr2c92), planned obsolescence is part of every 
consumer’s life. Although contemporary software devel-
opment and distribution have characteristics that differ 
substantially from the industrial products of the 1950s, 
the revenue models of companies in the software mar-
ketplace  often  welcome  elements  such  as  system  ver-
sioning, to encourage repurchases of a newer version of 
the same system, or vendor lock-ins that limit the cus-
tomer choice to certain providers of system or product 
(for  a  further  review,  see  Combs,  2000;  tinyurl.com/
aq2wl7h).  Newer  versions  of  programs  may  introduce 
compatibility  problems  with  earlier  operating  systems 
or programs (e.g., lack of backwards compatibility in In-
ternet  Explorer,  Microsoft  Office,  or  OS  X’s  OpenStep 
APIs). Some programs also introduce new file formats, 
which  can  cause  compatibility  issues  with  earlier  ver-
sions of the program (e.g., docx vs. doc). Furthermore, 
end-of-life announcements and concerns over end-of-
support deadlines may encourage users to upgrade, re-
gardless of the real need to do so.
The  right  to  fork  code  makes  implementing  such  ele-
ments  impracticable  in  open  source.  The  right  to  im-
prove a program, the right to combine many programs, 
and the right to make a program compatible with other 
programs and versions are all fundamental rights that 
are  built  into  the  very  definition  of  open  source.  Re-
search  has  shown  these  rights  are  often  exercised 
(Fitzgerald,  2006;  tinyurl.com/al995aj).  The  result  of  this 
constant  collaborative  improvement  in  open  source 
systems  is  that  any  program  with  the  support  of  the 
open  source  community  can  enjoy  assured  relevance 
rather  than  planned  obsolescence.  Furthermore,  with 
renewed  community  interest,  programs  that  have  de-
cayed  and  fallen  into  disuse  can  be  revived  and  up-Technology Innovation Management Review January 2013
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dated by forking the code from the original program. In 
fact, this is a fairly common practice: of the almost 400 
forks  studied  by  Nyman  and  Mikkonen  (2011; 
tinyurl.com/arntyur), 7% involved the reviving of an aban-
doned project. As long as there is sufficient community 
interest in a project, forking can allow for constant im-
provement in software functionality.
2. Community level
The  possibility  to  fork  is  central  to  the  governance  of 
any open source community. The shared ownership of 
open source projects allows anyone to fork a project at 
any time. Therefore, no one person or group has a “ma-
gical  hold”  over  the  project  (Fogel,  2006; 
tinyurl.com/ahbh8nt). Since a fork involving a split of the 
community  can  hurt  overall  productivity,  Fogel  notes 
that the potential to fork a program is “the indispens-
able ingredient that binds developers together”.
One of the concerns among open source communities 
is what Lerner and Tirole (2002;  tinyurl.com/bfmaxl4) call 
the hijacking of the code. Hijacking occurs when a com-
mercial vendor attempts to privatize a project’s source 
code.  The  2008  acquisition  of  MySQL  (mysql.com),  an 
open  source  relational  database  management  system, 
by  Sun  Microsystems  and  subsequent  acquisition  of 
Sun by Oracle is an example of a case involving com-
munity concern over potential hijacking. It had been ar-
gued that such a series of acquisitions would lead to the 
collapse  of  both  MySQL  and  the  open  source  move-
ment  at  large  (Foremski,  2006;  tinyurl.com/yesjhw7).  Re-
sponding  to  such  claims,  Moody  (2009;  tinyurl.com/
cbrq7g) noted that, while open source companies can be 
bought,  open  source  communities  cannot.  Forking 
provides the community that supports an open source 
project with a way to spin off their own version of the 
project  in  case  of  such  an  acquisition.  Indeed,  this  is 
what  happened  in  the  case  of  MYSQL.  The  original 
MySQL developer, Michael (“Monty”) Widenius, forked 
the MySQL code and started a new version under a dif-
ferent  name,  MariaDB,  due  to  concerns  regarding  the 
governance  and  future  openness  of  the  MySQL  code 
(for  details,  see  Widenius'  blog  [February  5,  2009: 
tinyurl.com/btr9bm6  and  December  12,  2009:  tinyurl.com/
ba58vpp] and press release [tinyurl.com/auvaxbn]).
Similarly, in 2010, community concerns regarding gov-
ernance  led  to  a  forking  of  the  OpenOffice  (OO;  open
office.org) project. The Document Foundation, which in-
cluded a team of long-term contributors to OO, forked 
the  OO  code  to  begin  LibreOffice  (libreoffice.org).  The 
spinoff project emphasized the importance of a “trans-
parent,  collaborative,  and  inclusive”  government  (The 
Document  Foundation;  tinyurl.com/bzmw5p2).  A  recent 
analysis  of  the  LibreOffice  project  indicates  that  this 
fork has resulted in a sustainable community with no 
signs  of  stagnation  (Gamalielsson  and  Lundell,  2012; 
tinyurl.com/a9ev4hu). Given that forking ensures that any 
project can continue as long as there is sufficient com-
munity  interest,  we  have  previously  described  forking 
as the “invisible hand of sustainability” in open source 
software (Nyman et al., 2011; tinyurl.com/b8bzorg).
Commonly, forking occurs due to a community’s desire 
to create different functionality or focus the project in a 
new direction. Such forks are based on a difference in 
software  requirements  or  focus,  rather  than  a  distrust 
of  the  project  leaders.  When  they  address  disparate 
community needs, different versions can prosper.
In a traditional company, it is the management, headed 
by  the  CEO  and  board  of  directors,  that  controls  the 
company and provides the impetus for continued de-
velopment. While the vision of the leadership is simil-
arly integral to the eventual success of any open source 
project,  their  continued  control  is  more  fragile  and 
hinges  upon  their  relationship  with  and  responses  to 
the community. Forking cannot be prevented by busi-
ness models or governance systems. The key lies in ap-
propriate  resource  allocation  and  careful  community 
management. Managers must strike a delicate balance 
between providing a driving force while appeasing and 
unifying  the  community.  (For  an  overview  of  open 
source  governance  models,  see  OSS  Watch 
[tinyurl.com/bjqpnkn]; for discussion on building technical 
communities, see Skerrett, 2008: [timreview.ca/article/160]; 
for  discussion  on  open  source  community  manage-
ment, see Byron, 2009: [timreview.ca/article/258].)
3. Business-ecosystem level
Within the dynamic world of open source software, nat-
ural selection acts as a culling force, constantly choos-
ing  only  the  fittest  code  to  survive  (Torvalds,  2001; 
tinyurl.com/aaxqux7).  However,  the  right  to  fork  means 
that any company can duplicate any competitor’s open 
source software distributions; thus, competitive advant-
age  cannot  depend  on  the  quality  of  the  code  alone. 
However, it is worth stressing that possibility does not 
equal success. The right to fork a commercially success-
ful  program  with  the  intention  of  competing  for  the 
same customer base still leaves the would-be competit-
or  with  issues  regarding  trademarks,  brand  value  and 
recognition, as well as the existing developer and user 
base  of  the  original  program.  Even  though  forking  al-
lows companies to compete with identical open source 
software,  it  is  nevertheless  cooperation  that  is  con-Technology Innovation Management Review January 2013
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sidered  to  be  the  key  to  corporate  success  (Skerrett, 
2011:  timreview.ca/article/409;  Muegge,  2011:  timreview.ca/
article/495).
Open source software is free, but it is also increasingly 
developed and supported for commercial gains (Wheel-
er,  2009:  timreview.ca/article/229).  While  the  right  to  fork 
may  seem  to  make  for  a  harsh  business  environment, 
open source companies can and do thrive. With its bil-
lion-dollar  revenue  (tinyurl.com/b7py36u),  Red  Hat  is  one 
such example. While their revenue primarily comes from 
subscriptions and services related to their software (see 
Suehle’s  [2012;  timreview.ca/article/513]  TIM  Review  Q&A 
for a more in-depth look at the secret of Red Hat’s suc-
cess), Red Hat’s programs themselves are largely based 
on  forks  of  programs  by  other  developers.  This  phe-
nomenon of combining forked programs is not unique 
to Red Hat: the hundreds of different Linux distributions 
(tinyurl.com/85r9o) are all made possible by the forking of 
existing products and repackaging them as a new release.
Forking lays the building blocks for innovators to intro-
duce new functionalities into the market, and the pleth-
ora  of  online  forges  have  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
programs  available  for  forking  and  reuse  in  any  new, 
creative way the user can imagine, allowing for the rap-
id  adaptation  to  the  needs  of  end  users.  Hence,  the 
practice of forking allows for the development of a ro-
bust,  responsive  software  ecosystem  that  is  able  to 
meet  an  abundance  of  demands  (Nyman  et  al.,  2012; 
tinyurl.com/acg3fp2).
The old adage, "one man’s trash is another man’s treas-
ure" is particularly salient in open source software de-
velopment.  Soon  after  Nokia’s  abandonment  of  the 
MeeGo project in 2011 (press release: tinyurl.com/ad5lh6b; 
MeeGo  summary:  tinyurl.com/9u4xrno),  the  Finnish  com-
pany  Jolla  announced  that  it  would  create  a  business 
around its revival, made possible by forking the original 
code (press release: tinyurl.com/7bzbo9h). On July 16, 2012, 
Jolla announced a contract with D. Phone, one of the 
largest cell phone retailers in China, and on November 
21  they  launched  Sailfish  OS  (tinyurl.com/a4yot8h). 
However, one does not need to be an open source busi-
ness to benefit from the right to fork. Forking can also 
aid companies who choose to use an existing program, 
or develop it for personal use. The requirement in open 
source to share one’s source code is linked with distri-
bution,  not  modification,  which  means  that  one  can 
fork a program and modify it for in-house use without 
having to supply the code to others. However, a work-
ing knowledge of licenses as well as license compatibil-
ity  (when  combining  programs)  is  crucial  before 
undertaking such an endeavour (for a discussion of li-
censes,  see  St.  Laurent  [2004;  tinyurl.com/befxwvc], 
Välimäki  [2005;  tinyurl.com/ahljzwu],  or  Meeker  [2008; 
tinyurl.com/am93qol]  for  a  discussion  of  architectural 
design practices in the combining of licenses, see Ham-
mouda and colleagues [2010; tinyurl.com/bfp82mw].
A summary of the ways in which forking can affect gov-
ernance  and  help  ensure  sustainability  is  provided  in 
Table 1.
Managerial Implications
Managers should consider the following implications of 
code forking:
• An abandoned project can become a business oppor-
tunity. 
• Neither business models nor governance systems can 
completely prevent forking. Thus, developer and com-
munity satisfaction is of key importance.
• A strong, vibrant community is a key issue to consider 
when implementing an open source program. When ac-
quiring systems, the potential of forking in open source 
software  –  in  particular  when  coupled  with  a  strong 
community – provides opportunities to avoid version-
ing and vendor lock-in to one provider of a product or 
system.  However,  while  community  is  important,  it  is 
not the only factor to consider. For more on evaluating 
and  selecting  open  source  software  for  corporate  use, 
see the May 2008 issue of TIM Review, including topical 
articles by Golden (2008; timreview.ca/article/145), von Rotz 
(2008;  timreview.ca/article/147),  and  Semeteys  (2008;
timreview.ca/article/146).
• There are thousands of open source programs already 
in existence, which can be forked. If a need for software 
arises and open source is an option, begin by analyzing 
what already exists on code repositories such as Source-
Forge  (sourceforge.net)  and  GitHub  (github.com).  Keep  in 
mind that it is distribution, not modification, that oblig-
ates the sharing of the source code. Be sure to read up 
on licenses first!Technology Innovation Management Review January 2013
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Conclusion
Forking sits at the intersection of several different open 
source  topics,  such  as  software  development,  gov-
ernance,  and  company  participation  in  communities 
and business ecosystems. In the interest of clarity, we 
have  simplified  the  categorization  of  the  multifaceted 
concept of forking. In actuality, there is overlap among 
the categories: a strong community offers better insur-
ance of sustainability of the software level, while better 
software  can  more  easily  attract  a  bigger  community. 
Both a poorly handled community and an abandoned 
project can spawn a business ecosystem competitor.
The right to fork code is intrinsic to open source soft-
ware and is guaranteed by all open source licenses. This 
right to fork has a significant effect on governance and 
helps ensure the sustainability of open source software. 
We have analyzed the effect of forking on three differ-
ent levels: the software level, the community level, and 
the ecosystem level. On a software level, code forking 
serves as a governance mechanism for sustainability by 
offering a way to overcome planned obsolescence and 
decay, as well as versioning, lock-in, and related con-
cerns. On a community level, code forking ensures sus-
tainability by providing the community with an escape 
hatch: the right to start a new version of the program. 
Finally, on an ecosystem level, forking serves as a core 
component of natural selection and as a catalyst for in-
novation.  Online  forges  offer  a  plethora  of  publically 
available programs that can serve as the building blocks 
of a new creation. Current projects can be forked, aban-
doned projects can be revived and commercialized, or 
programs  can  be  combined  in  novel  ways  to  better 
meet the needs of both the developers and end users. It 
is the right to fork that moulds the governance of open 
source projects and provides the dynamic vigour found 
in open source computing today.
Table 1. Forking and its effect on governanceTechnology Innovation Management Review January 2013
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